How we perceive the political bodies of other countries is largely dependent on labels. We might view one country as a liberal democracy, this other country as authoritarian, and that country as totalitarian. Labels are convenient, as they allow us to quickly come to conclusions on a nation’s functionality without having to dive deeper.
However, when we solely depend on labels we sometimes miss out on the bigger picture. When this happens, it becomes harder for us to understand or explain to ourselves certain things that we are witnessing in the world. The fascist label that has been prescribed to Russia is doing just that. Due to the Western world having only a basic understanding of Putin’s intellectual grounding, we fail to understand his thought process and even declare that he is acting irrationally.
Historian Timothy Snyder is a respected scholar in the field of fascism. He has analyzed Putin’s form of it and has come to numerous conclusions, especially in deconstructing his philosophical background. One of Snyder’s primary conclusions has to do with Putin and his association with the fascist Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin.
Ilyin was born in 1883 and produced many of his literary works in Germany as a result of Lenin’s rise to power. The two viewed each other as ideological enemies, largely due to Ilyin’s support of the White movement, an anti-revolutionary coalition that opposed the Bolsheviks.
Ilyin’s work largely concerned Russia’s statehood and the spiritual context behind what makes Russia so important. For Ilyin, “God’s, not Adam’s, was the original sin.” He believed that there was order and perfect unity before God created the world, and the first sin lied in God’s creation of it.
It is because of God’s sin, the creation of the world and man, that “every individual thought or passion deepened the hold of Satan on the world.” It is the conflicting ideas and passions involved with human nature that make the world such an ugly place. This is where the role of the Russian state becomes important.
Ilyin views Russian history as a story of victimhood. Being a victim in this context means for Ilyin that the Russian story is also one of innocence. Therefore, “only Russia had somehow escaped the evil of ‘history’ or ‘the fragmentation of human existence.’”
This thought process drove Ilyin to compare the totality and unity that existed before God’s creation to that of a cell and the biological body it clings to. For him, “Russia was not a country with individuals and institutions but an immortal creature, a ‘living organic unity.’” By displaying the relationship of the people and their government as a singular body, a world where “the political” and “the private” are one, we come to see the type of unity and totality that Ilyin envies so much.
This view on the relationship between the people of Russia and their leader is something that has transgressed Russian borders. Timothy Snyder illuminates Ilyin’s perspective yet again in a different piece where he states that “those who belonged within the Russian organism” had no other choice since “cells do not decide whether they belong to a body.”
This concept is an important perspective to take into account considering the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
In his essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” Putin dove into mythological thinking and displayed a historical perspective that accommodates Ilyin’s views on the “cell and the body.” One of the more alarming excerpts appears towards the end.
“Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people,” he wrote.
His historical diagnosis of what is needed for Ukrainian success lies in the fact that they are in some way innately inseparable. This description of the Ukrainian people exemplifies Ilyin’s lust for unity and totality. What infuriates Putin about Ukraine is something that would have infuriated Ilyin as well. Ukraine’s desire to “Westernize,” establish democracy and join NATO all represent for Ilyin and Putin the disharmony created as a result of “God’s sin.”
More blatant examples of Putin’s association with Ilyin have appeared in the past two decades. In 2005, Putin directly cited Ilyin in a speech addressed to the Federal Assembly. He also coordinated for the remains of Ilyin’s corpse to be reburied in Russia in the same year.
Putin’s frustrations with Lenin also resemble his appreciation for Ilyin’s work. What frustrates him most with Lenin is how he supposedly destroyed Russian unity. Putin believes it was Lenin’s “concept of a federative state with its entities having the right to secede” that “has heavily contributed to the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union.” If the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union means anything to Putin and Ilyin, it is the destruction of the totality they so desire.
Timothy Snyder’s argument in regard to Ilyin and Putin has come under scrutiny, most notably by French historian Marlene Laruelle. In her book titled “Is Russia Fascist?: Unraveling Propaganda East and West” She wrote that “it would be a mistake to claim that he has been Putin’s main doctrinal reference.” She also believed that Snyder had failed to acknowledge that “rehabilitating his writing as a whole would mean embracing too many ideological components with which the Kremlin cannot agree,” especially in regard to Ilyin being a “proponent of lustration against all communist elites.”
However, as we have seen with Putin’s criticism of Lenin, Ilyin’s main vision of Russia as being the proponent of unity and totality in some regards has been viewed as more valuable. Furthermore, it is important to note that whether or not Ilyin is Putin’s main doctrinal reference is not the point. The fact that certain aspects of Ilyin’s philosophy are in Putin’s ideological toolbox means that understanding Putin is impossible unless we also have a toolbox that includes Ilyin’s philosophy as well.
Russian specialist Anton Barbashin criticized Laruelle’s perspective even further. He noted that it is “total nonsense” to “call Putin a politician who is pursuing any sort of ideological or philosophical concept.” Yet this view still does not “exclude that Putin’s inner circle is predisposed to certain ideological paradigms.”
Barbashin went further, looking at those who surround Putin and how their decisions are influenced by Ilyin. This can be seen in how “Ilyin’s books were recommended as a must-read by two of the Kremlin’s ‘grey cardinals’ – Vladislav Surkov and Vyacheslav Volodin.” Barbashin also discussed a point made by independent Russian journalist Mikhael Zygar, who in his book “All the Kremlin’s Men” claimed, “it was precisely these works of Ilyin that influenced Putin’s definition of traditional Russian values.”
Barbashin’s criticism brought to light a simpler point to be made about this relationship. He points out that Ilyin is a “very dubious historical figure to draw inspiration from, even an inappropriate person just to quote.” Barbashin explains that this largely has to do with how much of a vocal proponent he was of fascism “even after the Second World War” in which Germany displayed how ugly the ideology is.
The fact that the Russian governing elite are so infatuated with a philosopher who vocalized his support for the Nazi regime is ironic, especially once it is considered that Russian state media has been justifying the Ukraine invasion from the start by claiming to be “de-nazifying” the country.
These arguments display a dispute on how influential Ilyin is on Putin’s (and the Kremlin’s) decision-making process. This is a topic that will continue to experience a considerable amount of debate, but one point is clear: the relationship exists.
Understanding that this relationship exists allows us to view the situation in Ukraine through a more educated lens. It allows us to take a step away from saying that Putin has completely lost his mind and is acting irrationally. By looking at the situation in such a way we give up on trying to understand why he is doing what he is doing. We fail to acknowledge the internal motives that exist within Putin’s head. Once we understand Ilyin, we might find it easier to understand Putin and predict what blood-stained decisions he might make next.
